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Understanding the Effect of Moral Transgressions in the Helping 




There is a vast academic literature on the moral dimensions and ethical dilemmas of what are 
commonly referred to as the helping professions, (e.g. nursing, medicine, social work, 
counseling, teaching, etc.). Over the past several decades, increasing attention has been paid to 
the issue of moral transgressions perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced by these professionals 
and their accompanying psychological and social outcomes. Scholars seeking to understand 
moral transgressions and their effects have proposed and examined a variety of constructs, 
including moral distress, demoralization, and moral injury.  This article examines to what extent 
constructs related to moral transgressions and their associated psychological, emotional, and 
social effects overlap and diverge to describe similar and/or distinct phenomena and proposes a 
unified conceptual model of moral suffering. Understanding the moral dimensions of the helping 
professions is critical for effective research and just, ethical practice.  
[Key words: demoralization; helping professionals; moral distress; moral injury] 
Introduction 
Professions that are geared toward caring for and aiding the physical, mental, emotional, or 
spiritual well-being of others, including teaching, social work, counseling, nursing, medicine, 
and ministry, are commonly referred to as the helping professions (Esterson 1982; Hawkins et al. 
2012). The term “helping” suggests a core value of altruism that is shared across these different 
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specialized professions. Skorupski (1998) defines morality as “that set of convictions whose 
function is to promote human flourishing, to enable us to live together on terms of mutually 
beneficial cooperation” (sec. 2, para. 1).  Therefore, the helping professions are, to some degree, 
shaped in moral terms. In addition to having an identity rooted in morality, many of the helping 
professions, including social work (National Association of Social Work 2017), psychology 
(American Psychological Association 2017), nursing (American Nurses Association 2015), and 
medicine (AMA Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2016), are guided by formal codes of 
ethics, which provide standards for professional behavior and outline the core beliefs, values, and 
moral principles to which all professionals are expected to adhere.  Even for helping professions 
that lack a formal, nationally adopted code of ethics, like teaching, ethical codes have been 
established by national unions (National Education Association 1975) and state-level licensing 
boards (e.g., Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers, Minnesota Administrative Rules 
8710.2100).  
The academic literature on the moral dimensions and ethical dilemmas of the helping 
professions is vast (e.g., Jameton 1984; Goodlad, Soder, and Sirotnik 1991; Carr 2000; Campbell 
2003; Strike and Soltis 2009; Reamer 2013). One area of the literature on morality in the helping 
professions that has garnered increasing attention in the 21st century concerns moral 
transgressions that are perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced by professionals, along with the 
accompanying psychological and social outcomes. Scholars seeking to understand moral 
transgressions and their effects have proposed and examined a variety of constructs, including 
moral injury (Shay 1994, 2014; Litz et al. 2009), moral distress (Jameton 1984, 1993), and 
demoralization (Gabel 2011, 2012, 2013; Santoro 2011).  Because these constructs (which will 
be described in depth in the next section) appear to address the influence of potentially morally 
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transgressive events on a helping professional’s psychological, emotional, and social well-being, 
questions arise as to what distinguishes them from each other. Are these constructs describing 
the same phenomena but employing different terms, depending on the academic and professional 
discipline?  Are they describing related but distinct phenomena with clear conceptual 
boundaries?  If the constructs relate to each other, how are they related?  
Understanding the moral dimensions of the helping professions and their practice 
contexts, particularly in terms of the sources and outcomes of moral violations, is critical for 
promoting just and ethical care and positive outcomes for recipients.  To increase this 
understanding, it is necessary to have conceptual clarity in order to develop applicable theoretical 
models that can be used to guide research and practice.  This article answers the following 
question: To what extent do constructs related to moral transgressions and their associated 
psychological, emotional, and social effects overlap and diverge to describe similar and/or 
distinct phenomena?  A broader conceptual understanding of these constructs and how they 
relate to one another will allow for more effective research into the moral actions, transgressions, 
and outcomes across the helping professions.  In the next section, I summarize the existing 
literature on each of the following constructs: moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization.  
Following these summaries, I present an analysis of the areas of similarity and divergence among 
the constructs and then present a proposed integrated model of moral suffering. The article ends 





Moral injury refers to the lasting emotional, psychological, and existential harm that occurs when 
an individual “perpetrates, fails to prevent, bears witness to, or learns about acts that transgress 
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deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al. 2009, 700).  Moral injury occurs when an 
individual experiences deeply troubling cognitive dissonance between their internal moral code 
and the actions that they engage in or witness (Litz et al. 2009).  Symptoms of moral injury 
include guilt, shame, anxiety, depression, and anger (Litz et al. 2009; Dombo, Gray, and Early 
2013; Jinkerson 2016) and can lead to a loss of trust in oneself or others, existential dread, and 
deep demoralization (Jinkerson 2016).  The symptoms of moral injury can be long-lasting, do not 
resolve easily on their own, and are often resistant to typical psychological treatments for trauma 
(Litz et al. 2009).  The damage to one’s internal moral schema or moral belief system is a 
particularly significant outcome of moral injury that can lead to irreparable change in an 
individual’s self-identity (Dombo et al. 2013).  Moral injury causes a “disruption in an 
individual’s confidence and expectations about one’s own or others’ motivation or capacity to 
behave in a just and ethical manner” (Drescher et al. 2011, 9), and a “breakdown in global 
meaning” (Currier et al. 2015, 26).   
Jonathan Shay, a military psychiatrist (1994, 2009, 2011, 2014), first used the term moral 
injury, and the vast majority of research on moral injury has occurred within the military context.  
Although the military is not traditionally considered to be a helping profession, it operates from a 
strong moral code and has a focus on self-sacrifice and helping others gain freedom, liberty, and 
safety. This can be viewed as a type of caring and altruism, and thus, for the purposes of this 
article, the military will be considered a helping profession.  Many participants who have 
reported experiencing moral injury also have a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD; Haight et al. 2016); however, scholars insist that moral injury, though it may occur 
concurrently with PTSD, is a distinct condition (Litz et al. 2009; Dombo et al. 2013; Shay 2014).  
In PTSD, traumatic events threaten one’s safety and mortality; in moral injury, the troubling act 
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threatens the validity of one’s internal moral framework (Dombo et al. 2013).  Although research 
on moral injury has occurred predominantly in military contexts, an increasing number of 
researchers have empirically explored the applicability of moral injury to other populations, such 
as refugees (Nickerson et al. 2015), teachers in El Salvador (Currier et al. 2015), women with 
substance abuse histories (Hartman 2015), women who have experienced intimate partner 
violence (Otte 2015), police officers (Papazoglou and Chopko 2017), parents and professionals 
involved in the child protection system (Haight, Sugrue, and Calhoun 2017; Haight, Sugrue, 
Calhoun, and Black 2017a, 2017b), and professionals in the US K12 education system (Sugrue, 
under review).  
MORAL DISTRESS 
The term moral distress was first coined by nursing ethicist Andrew Jameton (1984), and it 
refers to the “painful feelings and/or the psychological disequilibrium that occurs when nurses 
are conscious of the morally appropriate action a situation requires, but cannot carry out that 
action” (Corley 2002, 636-637) due either to internal constraints (e.g., fear) or external 
constraints (e.g., lack of time, lack of resources, legal limits, hierarchical decision-making; 
Corley 2002; McCarthy and Deady 2008).  Individuals experience moral distress when “they 
know the right thing to do, but they are unable to do it; or they do what they believe is the wrong 
thing to do” (McCarthy and Deady 2008, 254).  In 1993, Jameton refined his theory to 
distinguish between initial moral distress and reactive moral distress.  Initial moral distress 
refers to the emotional reaction (e.g., frustration, anger, and anxiety) experienced when one is 
confronted with a conflict between one’s moral values and available actions, while reactive 
moral distress refers to the lasting distress individuals experience after not acting in a way that is 
consistent with their moral values (Jameton 1993).  Symptoms of moral distress include anger, 
    6 
 
frustration, guilt, shame, anxiety, loss of self worth, depression, and powerlessness (Corley 
2002).  Research finds that nurses cope with moral distress by avoiding patient interaction 
(Raines 2000; Corley 2002; McCarthy and Deady 2008), abandoning their moral principles all 
together (Webster and Baylis 2000; Hamric 2012), or leaving the profession (Corley 2002; 
McCarthy and Deady 2008; Hamric 2012).  
Jameton (1984) distinguishes between moral uncertainty, in which individuals are unsure 
about the right action to take, and moral distress, in which individuals know what to do but are 
unable to do it.  McCarthy and Deady (2008) clarify that moral distress goes beyond emotional 
or psychological distress.  For example, a nurse could be emotionally distressed when 
performing a work task, such as restraining a patient, but not morally distressed if the nurse 
believed the restraint was the right thing to do (McCarthy and Deady 2008).  Additionally, 
Weinberg (2009) argues that moral distress is distinct from an ethical dilemma.  While ethical 
dilemmas are conceptualized as problems at the individual level, the conceptualization of moral 
distress acknowledges the role of larger systems including “political dimensions of practices, 
thereby enabling structural issues to be recast as ethical problems” (Lynch and Forde 2016, 96)  
Moral distress has received significant attention in the academic literature, both 
conceptually and empirically, but the research has been primarily confined to the field of 
nursing.  A Scopus search conducted on January 14, 2018 found 784 articles on moral distress 
published between 1987 and 2018.  All but four of the articles were published in nursing or other 
medical journals.  Despite the substantial body of literature on moral distress, there has been 
some uncertainty over the specifics of its definition (McCarthy and Deady 2008; Dudzinski 
2016). Dudzinski (2016) states that the exact definition and meaning of moral distress “is 
famously nebulous" (321).  Some scholars choose to focus on the role of external social and 
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institutional constraints in eliciting moral distress (e.g. Jameton 1984, 1993; Corley 2002), while 
others include the role of internal constraints (Webster and Baylis 2000).  Hanna (2004) argues 
that some scholars (e.g., Jameton 1984, 1993; Wilkinson 1988) focus too much on the 
psychological aspects of moral distress, to the point that they are conflating psychological 
distress with moral distress and ignoring the more salient ethical components of the phenomena.  
In response to this conceptual muddiness, McCarthy and Deady (2008) propose that moral 
distress should be considered “a cluster concept or umbrella concept” (259) capturing a range of 
symptoms and experiences of individuals who are morally constrained. 
Not only has the majority of research on moral distress occurred in nursing contexts, but 
it has occurred specifically in North American nursing contexts (Pauly, Varcoe, and Storch 
2012). Interestingly, in Scandinavia, there is a body of work within nursing literature that uses 
different terms, such as “moral stress” (Lützén et al. 2003) and “troubled conscience” (Glasberg 
et al. 2006), for what appears to be moral distress.  In this literature, “moral stress” refers to the 
emotional experience that occurs “when nurses are aware of what ethical principles are at stake 
in a specific situation and external factors prevent them from making a decision that would 
reduce the conflict between the contradicting principles” (Lutzen et al. 2003, 314).   “Troubled 
conscience,” as explained by Ann-Louise Glasberg and colleagues (2006), stems from the 
discrepancy that arises among one’s internal conscience or “voice,” internal desires or 
inclinations, and external demands when an individual “does not follow the voice of conscience” 
(635).  Some of the differences between moral distress and its counterparts in the Scandinavian 
literature could be due to translation alone, but an integration of the North American and 
European constructs could help to clarify moral distress’s conceptual ambiguity (Pauly et al. 
2012).  
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Recently, some scholars have pushed back against Jameton’s (1984, 1993) assertion that 
moral distress must involve a situation of moral constraint (Johnstone and Hutchinson 2015; 
Campbell, Ulrich, and Grady 2016; Fourie 2017).  Johnstone and Hutchinson (2015) argue that 
the dominant conceptualization of moral distress is based on the flawed assumption that nurses 
always know the right thing to do and the only reason they are not doing the right thing is 
because they are unable to, due to internal or external constraints.  The authors assert that to 
assume “the unequivocal correctness and justification of nurses’ moral judgments” (8) is a 
fallacy and this conceptualization of moral distress “understates the moral responsibility of 
nurses to take remedial action, even in difficult environments, and thus risks being apologist for 
their incapacities” (8).  Similarly, Campbell and colleagues (2016) point out that “life as a moral 
agent is complex” (3), and that frequently it is difficult if not impossible for nurses to know the 
correct moral action to take.  In contrast to Jameton (1984), who distinguishes between moral 
dilemmas (which are a source of moral distress) and moral uncertainty (which is not), Campbell 
and colleagues assert (2016) that both moral dilemmas and moral uncertainty can lead to moral 
distress.  Fourie (2017) proposes that moral distress is comprised of multiple categories, 
including the constraint-based moral distress as defined by Jameton (1984, 1993) and the 
uncertainty-based moral distress as identified by Campbell and colleagues (2016).  
DEMORALIZATION 
Demoralization is a construct that is used to describe “feelings of impotence, isolation, and 
despair” (Clarke and Kissane 2002, 734) in response to a perceived inability to deal effectively 
with a stressful experience (Clarke and Kissane 2002).  Demoralization is related to both an 
individual's moral beliefs and actions and with a loss of morale when important beliefs and 
values are lost (Gabel 2013).  When individuals are demoralized, they feel trapped, helpless, and 
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unable to respond to a stressful situation in a way that feels appropriate to them, all of which 
results in feelings of anxiety, depression, and “a sense of meaninglessness of life” (Clarke and 
Kissane 2002, 734).   
 Stewart Gabel (2011, 2012, 2013) has examined demoralization in the context of 
healthcare professionals and defines demoralization as “a condition of diminished morale or 
hopelessness that occurs when one's principles, values, or standards are threatened" (Gabel 2011, 
892).  Gabel (2013) argues that medicine and healthcare are rooted in moral beliefs and 
practices.  Over the centuries, newly graduating physicians have recited oaths and declarations 
focused on the common theme of “the obligation of physicians to strive to aid those seeking 
help” (Gabel 2013, 119). Demoralization can occur when the moral foundation of healthcare 
practice is threatened by a lack of resources, increasing commercialization of healthcare, or 
policy changes that limit the ability of professionals to provide the type of care that they feel 
morally obligated to provide.   
 Demoralization has also been applied in the field of education by Santoro (2011), who 
defines teacher demoralization as the phenomenon that occurs when a teacher is unable to access 
the moral rewards of teaching. Santoro (2011) argues that “morals, values, and principles 
comprise the essence of teaching” (4) and “the moral rewards of teaching are activated when 
educators feel that they are doing what is right in terms of one's students, the teaching profession, 
and themselves” (2).  Teacher demoralization happens when teachers lose the ability to act 
pedagogically in a way that feels right to them due to being overburdened by policies that are not 
consistent with their beliefs and values about their profession (Santoro 2011).  Santoro describes 
demoralized teachers as feeling “depressed, discouraged, shameful, and hopeless” (Santoro 2011, 
18).  
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 Santoro (2011) cites the hyper-focus on standardized testing after the passage of No 
Child Left Behind as a significant source of demoralization for teachers, as they are unable to 
exercise their moral agency while operating under policy requirements that dismiss their 
pedagogical knowledge, constrain their pedagogical judgment, and restrict their pedagogical 
authority (16).  When teachers attempt to challenge the policy requirements regarding 
standardized testing and measurement, they are characterized as self-serving, lazy, and 
incompetent (Santoro 2016).  Santoro (2016) introduces the term “moral madness” to refer to the 
deep feelings of confusion and disorientation experienced “when a person’s moral claims are not 
recognized as moral and the individual is disregarded as a moral agent” (2).   
 Gabel’s (2011, 2012, 2013) and Santoro’s (2011) work on demoralization in the context 
of healthcare professionals and educators, respectively, acknowledges that demoralization is a 
contributing factor to the more frequently discussed construct of burnout, but clarifies that the 
two are distinct constructs. Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter (2001) describe burnout as "a 
psychological syndrome in response to chronic interpersonal stressors on the job" (399) that 
consists of three dimensions: exhaustion, cynicism/depersonalization, and ineffectiveness 
(Maslach and Leiter 1997; Maslach et al. 2001).  Gabel (2013) argues that, although 
demoralization and burnout share similar symptoms such as anxiety, depression, and feelings of 
inefficacy, burnout can be considered primarily “a prolonged reaction to chronic stressors in the 
work environment” while demoralization “results from a threat to or loss of personal or 
professional values that are perceived to be crucial to an individual's sense of well-being” (122).   
Santoro (2011) argues that demoralization, defined as “the inability to access the moral 
rewards of teaching” (3), is often “misdiagnosed as burnout” (3).  Many researchers of teacher 
burnout conceptualize it as a problem related to the characteristics and actions of the individual 
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teacher and not to the context in which the teacher operates (Santoro 2011). For example, 
teachers who are at most risk of burnout are often described as being overly idealistic and having 
difficulty establishing a healthy work-life balance (Farber 2000; Chang 2009). From these 
perspectives, burnout is viewed primarily as a condition resulting from the depletion of a 
teacher’s internal resources for coping with the job and one that can be avoided with better self-
care (Santoro 2011).  In contrast, according to Santoro (2011), demoralization is rooted in the 
structure and context of education as a practice.  Unlike burnout, demoralization “is not the result 
of a lack of personal fortitude or moral sensibility but a fundamental change in the rewards 
available through the work” (Santoro 2011, 17).   
Discussion 
Table 1 provides a summary of the key characteristics of moral injury, moral distress, and 
demoralization.  The following section presents an integrated analysis of the three constructs. 
CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITIES 
Whereas research on moral injury has been primarily confined to military contexts, moral 
distress to healthcare settings, and demoralization to healthcare and education, there is clear 
overlap among the three constructs.  All three constructs describe emotional, psychological, and 
existential distress related to a violation of moral expectations and deeply held values (Jameton 
1984; Webster and Baylis 2000; Litz et al. 2009; Gabel 2011; Shay 2014). Clarke and Kissane’s 
(2002) assertion that individuals experience demoralization when “they have lost, or feel they are 
losing, something critical to their sense of self” (737) echoes Dombo and colleagues’ (2013) 
argument that the core of moral injury is “the threat to self-identity” (207) and Webster and 
Baylis’s (2000) description of the permanent change in self-identity that results from experiences 
of moral distress.  
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Like authors who describe moral injury’s lasting wounds (e.g., Litz et al. 2009), some 
scholars of moral distress describe deep wounds and threats to one’s moral integrity that can 
occur after violating one’s moral beliefs (Webster and Baylis 2000; McCarthy and Deady 2008).  
Webster and Baylis (2000) refer to these lingering feelings of distress as “moral residue.” 
Additionally, authors describe how moral distress permanently changes individuals’ sense of 
identity and the manner in which they connect with others (Webster and Baylis 2000; Hanna 
2004).  Webster and Baylis (2000) quote a medical student who experienced moral distress as 
saying that, “In the deepest part of yourself, you feel you will never be the same and you carry 
this with you for the rest of your life” (224).  These types of long-lasting injuries to the self and 
resulting existential crises arising from moral distress echo the descriptions of moral injury and 
its effects (Shay 1994, 2014; Litz et al. 2009; Drescher et al. 2011; Dombo et al. 2013). 
Similarly, the “sense of meaningless of life” that Clarke and Kissane (2002, 734) identify as an 
outcome of demoralization appears to be equivalent to the “breakdown in global meaning” (p. 3) 
that Joseph Currier and colleagues (2015) attribute to moral injury. In fact, Jinkerson (2016) 
points out that, “the final state of moral injury has been described as deep demoralization” (124).  
CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES 
Despite their having some similarities, there are several clear distinctions among moral injury, 
moral distress, and demoralization.  Conceptualizations of demoralization and moral distress 
focus on the inability of the primary actors to change their circumstances (Jameton 1984, 1993; 
Clarke and Kissane 2002; Santoro 2011).  In the demoralization literature, this inability is 
frequently referred to as “impotence” (Clarke and Kissane 2002), while the moral distress 
literature discusses “internal and external constraints” (Jameton 1984, 1993).  In both cases, the 
results are feelings of helpless and hopelessness as one is unable to respond in a manner that 
    13 
 
feels morally right (Corley 2002; Gabel 2011; Santoro 2011).  In contrast, internal or external 
constraints, although they may be present, are not required for a person to experience moral 
injury.  An individual could experience moral injury after having mistakenly or freely 
transgressed their moral expectations.  The action and one’s interpretation of the action as being 
morally transgressive leads to moral injury, regardless of whether or not the action occurred due 
to any constraints placed on the individual actor.  For example, a military veteran could 
experience moral injury after accidentally killing a civilian.  In this situation, the veteran may not 
have been personally forced to kill the civilian but made a mistake that resulted in the violation 
of a deeply held belief about the protection of civilians.   
The role of the individual experiencing distress also varies among conceptualizations of 
moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization.  A person can experience moral injury by 
perpetrating a moral transgression and/or witnessing or being the victim of someone else’s 
action, if that action was evaluated by the individual as being a violation of deeply held moral 
beliefs and expectations (Litz et al. 2009; Shay 2014).  In contrast, in demoralization and moral 
distress, the source of distress is the individual’s own immoral actions (or inactions) or their own 
inability to act in a way that is congruent with their moral beliefs (Clarke and Kissane 2002; 
Gabel 2011; Santoro 2011).   
EMERGING CONCEPTUAL CONVERGENCE 
As I previously stated, in recent years a number of scholars have advocated for broadening the 
conceptualization of moral distress (Campbell et al. 2016; Fourie 2017).  These broader 
conceptualizations have functioned to decrease the distinctions between moral injury and moral 
distress.  Campbell and colleagues (2016) propose the following definition of moral distress: 
“one or more negative self-directed emotions or attitudes that arise in response to one’s 
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perceived involvement in a situation that one perceives to be morally undesirable” (6).  By 
including the phrase “one’s perceived involvement,” Campbell and colleagues (2016) explain 
that they are being intentionally vague to allow for a wide range of roles that the individual could 
play in relation to the morally troubling event.  In this definition, the individual experiencing 
moral distress may be the perpetrator of the moral transgression, but also may be “simply 
connected, professionally or personally, to others who are more centrally involved in a morally 
undesirable situation” (Campbell et al. 2016, 6).  This broader conceptualization of the role of 
the individual in the moral transgression is similar to that of moral injury, in which the morally 
injured person may be the perpetrator, a witness, or a victim of the immoral act.   
In addition to broadening the role of the morally distressed individual in the 
transgression, Campbell and colleagues (2016) also advocate for broadening the potential 
sources of moral distress beyond situations involving moral constraint (Jameton 1984) and moral 
uncertainty (Fourie 2017) to include those involving what they term “moral luck.”  Campbell and 
colleagues (2016) use this term to refer to experiences in which “agents perform what they deem 
to be the morally best action based on the best information and evidence available to them at the 
time, without any internal or external constraints.  Yet, their actions, in conjunction with factors 
beyond their control, turn out to have morally undesirable consequences” (5).  In response to and 
in support of Campbell and colleagues (2016), Andrew McAnich (2016) points out that their 
conceptualization of moral distress is “similar to, and perhaps encompasses, another self-directed 
negative emotion that is characteristic of a particular domain: namely, moral injury among 
combat veterans” (30).  A commonly cited event associated with moral injury is the killing of 
civilians due to the ambiguity of combatants who are often embedded within civilian 
communities (Drescher and Foy 2008; Litz et al. 2009).  Consistent with Campbell and 
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colleagues’ (2016) description of “moral luck,” this type of morally injurious event can be 
characterized as a morally best action that resulted in morally undesirable consequences. 
Conceptualizations of moral injury have also moved from the narrow to the broad. 
McAnich (2016) notes that Shay’s original definition of moral injury was narrower, with a focus 
on the response to a betrayal by a person in authority in high-stakes context (Shay 1994, 2014).  
However, Litz and colleagues (2009) broadened this conceptualization to include actions by 
peers or the service member himself.  Most recently, McDonald (2017) challenged researchers 
and clinicians to expand their understanding of the true sources of moral injury. McDonald 
(2017) argues that when veterans experience moral injury, they are not solely troubled by what 
they or their colleagues did or failed to do, but by “the specter of a world without morals” that 
arises when one is confronted with deeply morally troubling events. Experiences of war shatter 
long held beliefs in rightness and wrongness and leave individuals facing “a world that has 
become morally irreconcilable” (McDonald 2017, 6).  According to McDonald (2017), this 
destruction of one’s belief in the world as a moral place should be considered the core of moral 
injury.  Interestingly, McDonald’s (2017) insistence on the significance of moral context as it 
relates to an individual’s experience of moral injury is echoed in Santoro’s (2011) writing on 
teacher demoralization.  Santoro (2011) argues that teachers experience demoralization when 
they can no longer access the moral rewards of teaching because the moral context of teaching is 
endangered.  In Santoro’s (2011) view, it is not the individual characteristics or even the 
individual actions of teachers that are the source of demoralization, but it is teaching itself that 
has become, in McDonald’s (2017) words, “morally irreconcilable” (6).  
PROPOSED INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL SUFFERING 
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As the conceptualizations of moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization are broadening, the 
overlaps that have always existed among these constructs are increasing.  These increasing 
similarities suggest that an integrated model is both more possible and more necessary.  In figure 
1, I present a proposed integrated conceptual model that I term moral suffering.  This model 
captures the key components and overlapping conceptualizations of moral distress, 
demoralization, and moral injury.  Similar to Litz and colleagues’ (2009) model of moral injury, 
the model of moral suffering begins with an experience of dissonance between an individual’s 
moral beliefs, values, and expectations and an experience of moral transgression.  In this model, 
a morally transgressive experience can involve individual immoral actions, similar to those 
described by Litz and colleagues (2009) or a more general experience of trying to operate within 
an immoral context, echoing McDonald’s (2017) idea that moral injury arises in the face of “the 
specter of a world without morals” (6) as well as Santoro’s conceptualization of demoralization 
as resulting not from individual immoral actions but from an educational context that is “morally 
irreconcilable” (6).  
In the proposed model of moral suffering, the relationship between individual immoral 
actions and an immoral context is circular and reciprocal; individual immoral actions collectively 
produce an immoral context or environment, while an immoral context also produces 
individuals’ immoral actions.  This model also includes the perspective of more recent 
researchers of moral distress (e.g. Johnstone and Hutchinson 2015; Campbell et al. 2016; Fourie 
2017) who argue that Jameton’s (1984) assertion that moral distress must involve a situation of 
moral constraint, in which an individual knows the right action to take but is unable to take it, is 
flawed.  In this model of moral suffering, individuals may commit a moral transgression for a 
variety of reasons, including because of an internal or external constraint as Jameton (1984) 
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proposes, because they are experiencing moral uncertainty and are unsure of what to do as 
Campbell and colleagues (2016) propose, because they committed an action and only later 
understood its moral implications, or because they accidentally committed a moral transgression.  
In this model of moral suffering, I am proposing that how or why a person experiences a moral 
transgression is much less important than the resulting moral cognitive dissonance and 
accompanying existential and psychological outcomes of this dissonance. 
As is illustrated in figure 1, the dissonance resulting from the mismatch between one’s 
moral beliefs and morally transgressive experiences leads to the loss of faith in oneself and 
others to act morally and the rejection of the belief in the world as moral place.  This sense of 
moral confusion and betrayal leads to feelings of guilt, shame, anxiety, anger, and depression.  
Moral suffering represents the experience of losing one’s moral beliefs and expectations and the 
accompanying psychological and emotional symptoms.  The experience of moral loss that is at 
the core of moral suffering is stressed in the writings of other prominent scholars of moral injury 
(e.g. Dombo et al. 2013; Drescher et al. 2011; Currier et al. 2015), moral distress (Webster and 
Baylis 2000), and demoralization (Clarke and Kissane 2002; Santoro 2011); although, it is absent 
from Litz and colleagues’ (2009) model of moral injury. 
This proposed model of moral suffering can be applied across a continuum of severity of 
symptoms and across contexts.  For example, a military veteran who participated in an operation 
in Afghanistan that resulted in the deaths of young children may have more severe psychological 
symptoms than a social worker who placed children in a foster home where they experienced 
extreme psychological distress and trauma.  Yet, both experiences could be described and 
explained by this model of moral suffering.  Depending on an individual’s moral beliefs and 
expectations, their reactions to moral transgressions may vary in severity both within and across 
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contexts.  However, the underlying mechanisms and resulting symptoms can all be understood 
within this model of moral suffering.  
An integrated model of moral suffering may be helpful in addressing the siloed nature of 
the current literature on the effect of moral transgressions on helping professionals.  As is 
demonstrated in table 1, most of the constructs have been researched nearly exclusively within 
one academic discipline or professional field.  In addition, there appears to be very little 
communication among the researchers of each individual construct.  In Haight and colleagues’ 
(2016) review of 27 empirical studies on moral injury published between 2011 and 2015, only 
four mentioned moral distress and none of the studies examined moral distress and its 
relationship to moral injury empirically.  The similarities between moral distress and 
demoralization, as defined by Gabel (2011, 2012, 2013) and Santoro (2011) are particularly 
strong, yet neither researcher mentions moral distress in their work, even though Gabel conducts 
research with healthcare providers.  The adoption of a unified construct, like that of moral 
suffering, could enhance cross-discipline research on the sources of and effects of moral 
transgressions in the context of helping professions that could help illuminate not just the 
suffering of individual professionals and clients but also the larger political, social, and structural 
forces that create situations in which moral transgressions occur.  These forces and systems need 
attention and action from academics and practitioners in the helping professions, but to address 
them effectively we must be able to speak the same language. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 
I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the constructs discussed in this article, and 
specifically my proposed model of moral suffering, to social work practice.  Despite the 
literature on moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization having originated in the fields of 
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nursing, military psychology, and medicine and education, respectively, over the past 5–10 
years, it has gradually gained attention among social work scholars.  Dombo and colleagues 
(2013) were the first social work scholars to propose the applicability of moral injury beyond the 
military battlefield to understand the suffering experienced by multiple different types of clients 
of clinical social work practitioners.  Haight and colleagues (2017) find that moral injury could 
be a useful construct in understanding and improving the experiences of professionals working in 
the child protection system.  Illustrating my argument for the significant conceptual overlap 
between moral injury and moral distress, Mänttäri-van der Kuip (2016) conducted a similar study 
on child welfare social workers in Finland, but applied the construct of moral distress instead of 
moral injury, and finds significant evidence of moral distress among this population.  Other 
studies of moral distress in social work literature have been primarily conducted on hospital-
based social workers (e.g., Lev and Ayalon 2016; Fantus et al. 2017; Fronek et al. 2017), perhaps 
due to moral distress’s origins in the field of hospital-based nursing.  More broadly, Oliver 
(2013), Weinberg (2009), and Lynch and Forde (2016) write convincingly of the need for moral 
distress to be a guiding concept in teaching ethics to social work students and in engaging social 
work practitioners in ethical practice, as it can reorient our field to the inherently moral nature of 
our work and help examine ways to address moral transgressions and injustice.  
 In making the case for the usefulness of moral suffering as a critical construct for social 
work practice, I draw primarily upon Weinberg’s (2009) argument for the usefulness of moral 
distress to social work.  First, moral suffering highlights the fact that social work practitioners 
experience real psychological and existential pain and suffering when they are involved in 
actions and environments that violate their moral beliefs and expectations.  As a profession, 
especially one that is “committed to the psychological health of people” (Weinberg 2009, 146), it 
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is ironic that we have not focused more on the negative psychological and social outcomes of 
moral suffering for social work practitioners.  Attention to moral suffering could aid in 
supporting the well-being, effectiveness, and professional retention of social workers with strong 
moral codes and a sensitivity toward injustice. 
Second, and I would argue more important for social work practice, is the role that moral 
suffering can play in drawing attention to the sources of injustice and immorality inherent in the 
contexts in which social workers practice.  Weinberg (2009) argues that social work ethics have 
become too narrowly construed, focused mostly on “the dyadic relationship between worker and 
service user” (143), and suggests that moral distress can highlight the connection between 
individual social workers and the larger social, political, and economic structures in which they 
work.  According to the proposed model of moral suffering, if an individual social worker 
experiences moral suffering this signifies that moral transgressions are occurring.  Most likely, 
the victims of these immoral actions and contexts are the individuals and communities who 
social workers are charged with helping.  Thus, the construct of moral suffering can be used to 
identify the structural and systemic sources of injustice and oppression that all social workers, by 
nature of our professional code of ethics (National Association of Social Work 2017) and 
historical mandate, have a responsibility to address.   
 Finally, in addition to helping to highlight sources of moral injustice, the application of a 
model of moral suffering to social work practice and scholarship can contribute to the 
development of effective strategies for responding to these sources of injustice in social work 
practice. As many organizations that employ social workers have become increasingly 
dominated by neo-liberal and market-driven approaches to social welfare, social workers are 
increasingly finding themselves in situations in which their actions are being shaped by immoral 
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systems and structures.  Some researchers call for a renewed focus on social work practitioners 
exercising moral courage (Fenton 2016), engaging in moral action (Keinemans and Kanne 2013), 
and using both covert and overt strategies in responding to moral injustices (Fine and Teram 
2013).  In addition to being a sensitizing construct for injustice, awareness of and understanding 
of moral suffering can spark a call to action for individual social workers and social work as a 
field to engage in the necessary systemic, structural, and political work required to promote 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Research Contexts, Characteristics, and Effects of Moral Injury, Moral Distress, and 
Demoralization 
 
    Impact 
Construct Primary Context 
of Research 
Role of the 
Individual in the 
Moral 
Transgression 





Existential  Social  
Moral injury Military  Perpetrator; 
witness; victim 
Individual commits a moral 
transgression either 
intentionally, accidentally, or 
because they feel they have no 
other choice; individual may or 
may not be fully aware of the 
immorality of the action prior to 





Loss of trust in 





Moral distress Nursing Perpetrator Individual knows what the 
moral choice is, but chooses 
the immoral choice due to 
internal or external constraints 
on their actions; individual 
experiences moral uncertainty 







Threat to sense 
of self 
Distancing from patients; 






Individual is impotent; unable to 
act in a way that is morally 
congruent with his/her beliefs 








Threat to sense 
of self; lack of 
meaning to the 
world 
Leaving the profession 
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Loss of trust in oneself 
& others to act morally 
Loss of belief in the 
world as a moral place 
Guilt, shame, anger, 
anxiety, depression, 
demoralization 
Moral Suffering 
